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INTERNATIONAL SPAM REGULATION &
ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOLLOWING THE WORLD SUMMIT ON
THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
Meyer Potashman*
Abstract: Unsolicited bulk e-mail, or “spam,” is often called the scourge
of the information age. Because of the cross-border nature of the Inter-
net, both governments and the private sector are facing many chal-
lenges in combating cross-border spam. In recent years, through the
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the international
community has committed itself to ªght spam on a global level through
increased cooperation and enforcement of spam laws. This Note evalu-
ates many of the issues involved in preventing cross-border spam, dis-
cusses the latest methods of enforcement in both the private and public
sectors, and recommends an approach to the problem in light of the
commitments made at WSIS.
Introduction
Unsolicited bulk e-mail, or “spam,” is widely considered to be the
scourge of the information age.1 Millions of unwanted e-mail messages
sent every day affect virtually everyone with an e-mail account.2 These
spam messages cost Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and Internet us-
ers millions of dollars due to lost productivity and technical resources.3
To some extent, the rise of spam has slowed the spread of the Internet
                                                                                                                     
* Meyer Potashman is a Production Editor of the Boston College International & Com-
parative Law Review.
1 U.N. Info. & Commc’n Techs. Task Force, Global Forum on Internet Govern-
ance—Informal Summary 11 (2004), available at http://www.unicttaskforce.org/perl/
documents.pl?do=download;id=565.
2 See, e.g., Robert Horton, Int’l Telecomms. Union, ITU WSIS Thematic Meeting
on Countering Spam, Chairman’s Report ¶ 11 (2004), available at http://www.itu.int/
osg/spu/spam/chairman-report.pdf; see also Claudia Sarrocco, ITU WSIS Thematic
Meeting on Countering SPAM: Spam in the Information Society: Building Frame-
works for international Cooperation 4 (2004), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/
spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_Building%20frameworks%20for%20Intl
%20Cooperation.pdf (noting that spam represents up to 76% of all e-mail trafªc).
3 Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 4.
324 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:323
and related technologies in the developing world as well.4 The public
and private sectors have proposed many technical and legal approaches
to combating spam.5 One key obstacle in this ªght, however, is the po-
litical boundaries between independent states.6 The Internet, of course,
has no boundaries, so spam can easily travel from one country to the
next, making it difªcult to track down its senders.7 In recent years, sev-
eral countries have passed laws criminalizing spam, but without interna-
tional cooperation, it is difªcult to enforce these laws against foreign
spammers.8
The United Nations has convened a two-part summit meeting to
address this and other Internet-related issues.9 Known as the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the summit ªrst con-
vened in Geneva in 2003 and met again in November 2005 in Tunis.10
At the various summit meetings, the international community com-
mitted itself to the ªght against spam.11 This Note will explore the
anti-spam options that the international community discussed in these
forums, as well as some steps for continuing the ªght against spam in
the future. Part I provides some background to the spam problem,
                                                                                                                     
4 See Contribution to the ITU WSIS Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam From
Kenya, Sudan, Tanzania And Zambia (2004), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/
spam/contributions/Developing%20countries_contribution.pdf [hereinafter Developing
Nations Contribution].
5 See generally Horton, supra note 2, ¶¶ 16–34.
6 See John Magee, The Law Regulating Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail: An International Per-
spective, 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 333, 378 (2003) (“The jurisdic-
tional problems created by the proliferation of transborder unsolicited e-mail communica-
tions represent what may prove to be an insurmountable hurdle.”).
7 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 17.
8 For a summary of international spam laws, see David Sorkin, Spam Laws, http://
www.spamlaws.com (last visited Mar. 7, 2006). For a summary of the jurisdictional chal-
lenges in enforcing spam, see Philippe Gérard, Int’l Telecomms. Union, ITU WSIS
Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam: Multilateral and Bilateral Cooperation
to Combat Spam 10–12 (2004), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contribu-
tions/Background%20Paper_Multilateral%20Bilateral%20Coop.pdf.
9 See Wendy M. Grossman, Nations Plan for Net’s Future, Wired News, Oct. 11, 2004,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,65254,00.html.
10 Hans Klein, Understanding WSIS: An Institutional Analysis of the UN World
Summit on the Information Society 3 (2003), available at http://www.ip3.gatech.edu/
images/Klein_WSIS.pdf.
11 World Summit on the Info. Society, Declaration of Principles (WSIS Doc.
No. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/0004) (2003) ¶ 37, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_
pub/itu-s/md/03/wsis/doc/S03-WSIS-DOC-0004!!PDF-E.pdf [hereinafter Declaration
of Principles] (noting the Geneva summit’s commitment to address the spam issue);
World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Agenda for the Information
Society (WSIS Doc. No. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6 (Rev. 1)-E) (2005) ¶¶ 41–42, available
at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html [hereinafter Tunis Agenda].
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attempted technical and legal solutions, and the current state of in-
ternational spam cooperation. Part II discusses the various issues in-
volved in deªning spam, global “Internet governance,” the crafting of
spam laws, and the compromises inherent in international solutions
to the problem. Finally, Part III suggests some recommendations on
how to put in action the goals of WSIS by structuring a ºexible yet
effective international anti-spam regime.
I. Background & History
During the relatively short history of the Internet, spam has
grown into a major problem, prompting action by many different par-
ties and institutions around the world.12
A. Spam’s Harmful Effects
Though people deªne spam in several different ways, in general,
people consider many kinds of unwanted e-mail to be spam.13 Spam
ranges from unsolicited yet legitimate sales pitches, to pitches for objec-
tionable yet possibly legitimate services such as pornography and other
sexually-explicit materials.14 Spam also encompasses a wide range of
advertisements for pharmaceuticals of questionable origin, mortgages,
pyramid schemes, and other goods and services, many of which are
purely fraudulent.15 Some of the more damaging types of spam are
those that include computer viruses and identity-theft schemes, which
attempt to induce recipients to reveal sensitive personal information.16
The spam problem has increased dramatically throughout the
world in recent years.17 Spam is estimated to account for around 76%
of all e-mail trafªc.18 It is estimated to cost Internet users worldwide
around $10 billion per year, which excludes productivity and direct
ªnancial losses caused by viruses and identity theft.19
                                                                                                                     
12 See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830–34 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(providing an overview of the history of the Internet); Gérard, supra note 8, at 3–6.
13 See David E. Sorkin, Technical and Legal Approaches to Unsolicited Electronic Mail, 35
U.S.F. L. Rev. 325, 327–35 (2001).
14 Id. at 336; Magee, supra note 6, at 339.
15 For an overview of types of spam, see VirusList.com, Types of Spam, http://www.vi-
ruslist.com/en/spam/info?chapter=153350533 (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
16 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 9–10.
17 See Gérard, supra note 8, at 4.
18 Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 4.
19 Id.
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The problem with spam is that it is proªtable, largely because its
costs are shifted from the spammers to their recipients.20 Unlike direct
postal mail, where the sender pays for each message, the cost to the
sender of each e-mail is negligible.21 Thus, spammers can market their
wares to millions of people with minimal cost to them.22 They only
need to convert a small fraction of their messages into sales to reap a
signiªcant proªt.23 Their recipients and ISPs, however, bear the costs in
several ways.24 Users lose time, and sometimes access fees, “sifting
through, identifying, and deleting the messages,” as well as in attempt-
ing to unsubscribe from spam lists or updating their spam ªlters.25
Similarly, ISPs suffer as their servers and network capacity become
clogged with spam, forcing them to expand their resources to account
for the spam on their networks.26 An increase in spam on an ISP’s net-
work also affects that ISP’s goodwill and could result in customer turn-
over as customers abandon their spam-clogged e-mail accounts for al-
ternative addresses with other providers.27 These costs ultimately are
shifted to consumers in higher access fees.28 In addition to the ªnancial
costs of spam, the plethora of sexually explicit spam raises concerns for
parents who do not want their children exposed to such messages.29
Spam has also had a particularly harsh effect on developing
economies, which are still in the process of building their Internet and
communications infrastructure.30 In sub-Saharan Africa, for example,
Internet access is often satellite-based and very expensive.31 As this ex-
pensive bandwidth is clogged with spam, it becomes difªcult for ISPs to
justify continuing their services.32 To compound this problem, some
                                                                                                                     
20 Magee, supra note 6, at 338; Ho Khee Yoke & Lawrence Tan, Int’l Telecomms. Un-
ion, ITU WSIS Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam: Curbing Spam via Technical
Measures: An Overview 3 (2004), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contribu-
tions/Background%20Paper_Curbing%20Spam%20Via%20Technical%20Measures.pdf.
21 Magee, supra note 6, at 338.
22 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 4.
23 See id.
24 See generally Magee, supra note 6, at 338–39 (explaining how costs are shifted away
from spammers).
25 Id. at 338.
26 See id. at 339.
27 See id. (noting that spam may cause ISPs to lose business and suffer reputation dam-
age “due to continued clogged bandwidth”).
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 See Developing Nations Contribution, supra note 4.
31 Id.
32 Id.
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users would rather not pay for expensive Internet services at all if the
bulk of what they pay for is wasted on spam.33
B. The Most Damaging Types of Spam
The most damaging spam, which causes considerable harm to the
world’s economies, consists of those messages that spread viruses,
frauds, and scams.34 These messages turn spam from a mere annoying
marketing method into a more damaging tool to invade recipients’ pri-
vacy and to separate them from their money.35 Many messages are sent
through computer viruses, such as the infamous “Melissa” virus, that
automatically resend messages to people on a recipient’s contact list.36
Sometimes viruses turn computers into “zombies,” enabling a spammer
to take advantage of an innocent user’s Internet connection and help-
ing the spammer disguise his or her identity.37 It is estimated that
“zombies” are responsible for a high percentage of all spam sent.38 Age-
old scams, such as the “Nigeria Letter” e-mail, that purport to offer
large sums of money to recipients in exchange for sending an initial
deposit are also very prevalent forms of spam.39
Another common spam threat is known as “phishing.”40 This is
an identity theft method through which spammers attempt to obtain
user’s passwords by sending fraudulent e-mails purporting to be from
ªnancial service providers.41 These e-mails generally misdirect recipi-
ents to a false website where users are prompted to reveal sensitive
information that the senders can then use to liquidate the recipient’s
assets.42
                                                                                                                     
33 Id.
34 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 9–10.
35 See id. at 9.
36 See Magee, supra note 6, at 339–40; Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 3.
37 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 5.
38 Grant Gross, Is CAN-SPAM Working?: One Year After It Went into Effect, Many Say the Na-
tion’s Antispam Law Is Ineffective, PC World.com, Dec. 28, 2004, http://www.pcworld.com/
news/article/0,aid,119058,00.asp (stating that over a three week period in late 2004, a
study found that 69% of all spam sent was sent through “zombie” computers).
39 Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 9.
40 See id. at 9–10. See generally Dave Brunswick, Tumbleweed Commc’ns Anti-
Phishing Working Group, The Rise of Phishing (2004), available at http://www.itu.int/
osg/spu/spam/presentations/BRUNSWICK_Session%202.pdf.
41 Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 9–10.
42 Id.
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C. Spam as an International Issue
The spam problem has many international dimensions.43 Fun-
damentally, the Internet does not have any national boundaries.44 At
its core, it is a mechanism for connecting multiple computers and is
intended as a loose and virtually ungovernable network.45 The only
component of the Internet that arguably corresponds to states is what
is known as the Country Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD) system.46
This is the system that assigns the last section of Internet addresses to
names corresponding to countries (such as www.bbc.co.uk for the UK,
or www.amazon.fr for Amazon’s French site).47
It is generally impossible to determine a spam’s originating coun-
try based on its sender’s e-mail address.48 This creates a system in
which any national spam laws are difªcult to enforce.49 Even if plain-
tiffs and prosecutors can locate a spammer or his service provider,
they often lack jurisdiction to bring these defendants to court.50 Fur-
ther, even if a country would be willing to extend jurisdiction beyond
its national boundaries, it can be very difªcult to enforce a judgment
against such a defendant.51
D. Technical Approaches to Combating Spam
As the spam problem continues to grow, many organizations have
developed anti-spam technologies.52 The technical problems with deal-
ing with spam are largely related to the minimal security built into e-
                                                                                                                     
43 See generally id.
44 Id. at 17.
45 See Vinton G. Cerf, “First, Do No Harm,” in Internet Governance: A Grand Col-
laboration 13, 14 (Don MacLean ed., 2004), available at http://www.unicttaskforce.org/
perl/documents.pl?do=download;id=778 [hereinafter Internet Governance] (noting
that “the Internet has evolved openly, freely,” and without government intrusion).
46 See generally Michael Geist, Governments and Country-Code Top Level Domains: A Global
Survey, in Internet Governance, supra note 45, at 282 (discussing the role of national
governments in managing their ccTLDs).
47 Id.
48 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that many e-mail addresses have no geo-
graphic identiªer and even when messages are sent from an address with a ccTLD, that
does not provide any indication about the location from which the message was sent).
49 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 See also Sorkin, supra note 13, at 344–51. See generally Yoke & Tan, supra note 20.
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mail technologies when they were ªrst developed.53 As the Internet has
expanded and questionable conduct such as spam has grown with it,
these security ºaws have enabled the spam problem to persist.54 The
technical solutions being implemented are largely built to plug these
security holes.55
Spam-ªghting technologies can be roughly grouped into three
forms.56 First and perhaps most important are those efforts to combat
spam at the originating e-mail server in order to prevent messages
from ever being sent.57 Second, there are systems that reside at the
ISP of the e-mail recipient that try to stop the messages.58 Lastly there
are systems controlled by Internet users themselves that help block
spam before they reach the user.59
1. Blocking Spam From the Originating Server
To stop mail at its origin point, ISPs must attempt to add layers of
security to their e-mail servers.60 The protocol, or technology standard,
used to send most e-mails is known as SMTP, or Simple Mail Transfer
Protocol.61 SMTP servers, which are responsible for sending most e-
mail, do not need to be authenticated in any way.62 As a result, spam-
mers can often take advantage of available open servers, or “open re-
lays,” and route their mail through these unsecured servers.63 These
spammers take advantage of other ISPs’ servers without authorization,
and because there is no authentication, the spammers can disguise
their identities.64 There are several solutions to this problem.65 For ex-
ample, if every ISP required some kind of outgoing authentication,
                                                                                                                     
53 See, e.g., Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 5 (“the basic Internet architecture . . . is intrinsi-
cally insecure, allowing spammers to operate anonymously and to evade law enforce-
ment”).
54 Id.
55 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 6 (noting that closing security loopholes can help re-
solve the spam problem).
56 See id. at 4–5.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 5–6.
61 For a more complete deªnition of the SMTP protocol, see Deªnition of SMTP, We-
bopedia, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SMTP.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2006).
62 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 5.
63 See Sorkin, supra note 13, at 339.
64 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 13.
65 See, e.g., Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 5–7.
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then ISPs would be able to track every spam message to a particular
account and deactivate the account before more spam is sent.66
Another technical solution is to block a network communications
port on computers and networks known as “Port 25.”67 Today, over
40% of all spam is sent, often via Port 25, by unwitting users whose
computers have become spamming “zombies,” after being infected
with a virus.68 If ISPs block this port from their networks, then they
can limit the amount of spam being sent in this manner.69
Third, ISPs can limit the number of outgoing e-mails that can be
sent by any one user.70 This would permit users to send e-mails to a
limited list of recipients, while stopping spam messages from being
sent to thousands of people at a time.71
Lastly, many organizations have been developing authentication
mechanisms that ensure that the name and e-mail address on an e-
mail message indeed corresponds to the correct user.72 Outgoing ISPs
can conªrm that e-mails are indeed sent from their customers and are
not fraudulent, so incoming ISPs can then route them efªciently.73
This, however, raises several problems.74 These authentication systems
have not been standardized, so there is no common way for users to
authenticate themselves or for recipients to conªrm that authentica-
tion.75 The other problem is that legitimate users, who have not, for
whatever reason, been able to authenticate their e-mail address, may
ªnd that their messages are rejected by recipients.76
                                                                                                                     
66 Id. at 6–7; cf. Magee, supra note 6, at 343–44 (discussing efforts by ISPs to prevent
spam by including anti-spam terms in their user contracts but noting that the lack of
authentication makes it difªcult to enforce these contracts).
67 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 5. For a discussion of network ports and related termi-
nology, see Port (computing), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Port_(comput-
ing)&oldid=41985982 (last visited March 3, 2006).
68 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 5; see also Gross, supra note 38.
69 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 5.
70 Id. at 6.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 6–7.
74 See infra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
75 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 7 (listing the various proposed authentication meth-
ods).
76 Cf. id. at 5 (noting that similar solutions, such as Port 25 blocking, can have the ef-
fect of blocking legitimate e-mails).
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2. Blocking Spam by the Receiving ISP
At the receiving ISP, several options are available as well.77 One of
the more controversial options is to implement a reputation system.78
These systems rate incoming mail servers by their reputations for send-
ing spam.79 If an ISP is known to be the source of spam, a receiving ISP
can simply block all e-mail trafªc from that ISP.80 The risk here is that
not all e-mail trafªc from that ISP is likely to be spam and many legiti-
mate e-mails could be blocked.81 One form of these reputation systems
are “blacklists” and “whitelists,” which companies compile to list e-mail
addresses, domains, and IP addresses that are deemed either consistent
spammers or safe senders, respectively.82 Blacklists and whitelists have
been effective at blocking some spam and are shared with ISPs to use in
conjunction with other spam-ªghting methods.83
3. End-user Spam Filtering Techniques
Lastly, there are end-user based ªltering mechanisms.84 These
can be both static and Bayesian.85 Static ªlters are simply lists of e-mail
addresses from which e-mails are automatically deleted.86 Bayesian
ªltering provides a more robust solution that gradually “learns” what
a user regards as spam.87 The problem with these systems is that they
tend to generate false positives and mark legitimate mail as spam,
while spammers are constantly working to beat their algorithms.88
Both of these ªltering technologies are widely used in all of the major
e-mail services today.89
                                                                                                                     
77 See id. at 5–11.
78 Id. at 9–10.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 12.
82 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 9–10.
83 See The Spamhaus Project, http://www.spamhaus.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2006) (pro-
viding blacklists, whitelists, and other anti-spam services to ISPs); see also John Levine, How to
Stop Spam, CircleID, Jan. 24, 2005, http://www.circleid.com/posts/how_to_stop_spam/.
84 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 11–13.
85 Id. For additional background on Bayesian spam ªltering, see Bayesian Filter,
http://whatis.techtarget.com/deªnition/0,289893,sid9_gci957306,00.html (last visited Mar.
8, 2006).
86 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 11–13.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 14 (noting the false positive risk and that spammers try to avoid ªlters by pur-
posely misspelling words in their spam).
89 Yoke & Tan, supra note 20, at 13.
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E. National Legislative Approaches to Fighting Spam
While technical solutions have proliferated, many national gov-
ernments, and indeed much of the international community, believe
that the ªght against spam cannot be adequately fought without legisla-
tion and enforcement.90 As a result, many countries have enacted anti-
spam laws.91 These laws diverge, however, in their deªnitions of spam
and their methods of enforcement.92 These differences may prove to
make international cooperation difªcult in the future.93 There are
many different models for enforcing spam laws, so countries have en-
acted laws with any combination of criminal sanctions, civil actions
brought by their governments, or private rights of actions that may be
brought by individuals or ISPs.94
There are, however, some commonalities to most of these laws.95
Most consider unsolicited e-mail to be illegal when it conceals the
sender’s identity, uses a third party’s domain name without permis-
sion, or provides misleading information in the subject line of the e-
mail.96 In general, these laws either use an opt-in approach, in which
prior authorization is required, or an opt-out approach, in which the
recipient can opt-out of future messages.97 Many of the laws require
senders to clearly and accurately identify themselves as well.98
One such law is the CAN-SPAM Act, which the U.S. Congress en-
acted in 2003.99 The Act preempted several state spam laws that had
                                                                                                                     
90 See Horton, supra note 2, at ¶ 23. See generally Matthew B. Prince, How to Craft
an Effective Anti-Spam Law (2004), http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/
Background%20Paper_How%20to%20craft%20and%20effective%20anti-spam%20law.pdf
(recommending how legislation and enforcement can be more effective).
91 See generally Int’l Telecomms. Union, ITU Survey on Anti-Spam Legislation
Worldwide (2005), available at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/legislation/Background
_Paper_ITU_Bueti_Survey.pdf; Int’l Telecomms. Union, Annex I: Worldwide Authori-
ties and Legislative Frameworks Addressing Spam [Draft in Progress] (2004), avail-
able at http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/spam/contributions/Background%20Paper_Building%20
frameworks%20for%20Intl%20Cooperation_Annex%201.pdf [hereinafter World-wide Auth
orities] (reviewing several countries’ spam laws).
92 Horton, supra note 2, at ¶ 26 (noting that there is little agreement across jurisdic-
tions as to what anti-spam laws prohibit).
93 Id.
94 See Prince, supra note 90, at 7-8; Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 14.
95 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 14.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003,
15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713, 18 U.S.C. § 1037 (2006).
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attempted to solve the problem.100 The law follows an “opt-out” policy,
permitting unsolicited bulk email as long as the messages are not mis-
leading or fraudulent, accurately represent the purpose of the message,
and provide recipients an opt-out option.101 This opt-out mechanism
must work and there must be a legitimate e-mail address to which users
can send messages to unsubscribe.102 This is meant to address the prob-
lem of spammers providing ineffective or fraudulent methods of opting
out.103
The U.S. Congress identiªes spam as messages that: (1) are sent
through a server without authorization; (2) are sent via “zombie” com-
puters with the intent to deceive recipients or ISPs; (3) have falsiªed
header information, such as “from,” “to,” or tracking information; (4)
that falsify the identity of the sender; or (5) otherwise falsely represent
the sender.104
The CAN-SPAM Act provides for criminal enforcement by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and provides a civil cause of action
for state attorneys general and ISPs to sue spammers.105 Several prose-
cutions and civil actions were brought pursuant to the CAN-SPAM Act
in its ªrst year of enactment.106 The CAN-SPAM Act, however, received
much criticism for its opt-out approach, which effectively permits
spammers to send one e-mail to anyone, provided that there is an opt-
out mechanism.107 Studies have shown no noticeable decline of spam
since the Act went into effect.108
Elsewhere, Australia passed its 2003 Spam Act, which went into
effect in April 2004.109 This is an opt-in regime, forbidding spam from
being sent even once, and providing primarily for civil damages
                                                                                                                     
100 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1). See generally Magee, supra note 6, at 356–58 (providing an
overview of pre-CAN-SPAM state laws).
101 15 U.S.C § 7704(a).
102 Id.
103 See id. § 7701(a)(9).
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 1037(a).
105 15 U.S.C. § 7706(d), (f), (g).
106 See Horton, supra note 2, ¶ 27; David Cohen, Spam Is Finally a Crime, Wired News,
Nov. 4, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,65594,00.html.
107 See Tom Zeller, Jr., Law Barring Junk E-Mail Allows a Flood Instead, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
2005, at A1; Spamhaus, Spamhaus Position on CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (S.877 / HR
2214), http://www.spamhaus.org/position/CAN-SPAM_Act_2003.html (last visited Mar. 7,
2006) (“Spamhaus sees the introduction of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003 (S.877/HR 2214)
as a serious failure of the United States government to understand the Spam problem.”).
108 See Zeller, supra note 107.
109 Worldwide Authorities, supra note 91, at 3.
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against spammers.110 Similarly, the European Union has also enacted
opt-in spam legislation.111 Despite the stronger regime, critics argue
that because most spam originates outside of Europe, the law lacks
enforcement power.112
F. International Cooperation on Spam
In recent years, many countries have recognized that without in-
ternational cooperation, their domestic anti-spam legislation is in-
sufªcient.113 As a result, several countries have begun cooperating on
anti-spam initiatives.114 Australia has made international spam coop-
eration a key element in a multi-tiered strategy to combat spam.115
Australia has proposed a ºexible approach to cooperation in which
different countries (1) introduce domestic spam legislation that is
reasonably coordinated and (2) commit to respond effectively to in-
formation about spammers beyond their borders.116 Australia has
proposed and entered into a few bilateral and multilateral agreements
dealing with spam.117
The European Union has also proposed a system of cooperation to
combat spam.118 It has proposed a series of coordinated actions that
member states should implement, including effective enforcement of
laws and national strategies to ensure communications between the
various regulatory agencies.119 It also suggests using or creating a “liai-
son mechanism” to help support cross-border spam enforcement.120
The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia recently
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreeing to
work together to combat spam.121 This agreement committed the coun-
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tries’ respective spam-ªghting agencies to working together to enforce
each country’s spam laws.122 Recognizing that “[i]llegal spam does not
respect national boundaries,” the FTC agreed to work closely with the
United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Australia’s
Competition and Consumer Commission, and the Australian Commu-
nications Authority to share research, knowledge, technical expertise,
evidence, and other enforcement information.123 The MoU respects
the different spam laws in each country, with their different deªnitions
of spam, yet it encourages each country to cooperate in enforcing the
laws in the other countries.124 It also recognizes that it is impossible to
cooperate on every spam case, so it recommends cooperation on only
the most signiªcant or most damaging spam cases.125
Perhaps the most signiªcant effort at internationalizing the spam
problem began with a global summit of the United Nations, known as
the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).126 This summit
took place over the course of a few years, ªrst meeting in December,
2003 in Geneva and meeting again in November, 2005 in Tunis.127
The summit was sponsored by the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), which is a UN body charged with regulating parts of the
international telecommunications infrastructure.128
The summit arose out of UN General Assembly Resolution
56/183, which, as part of the Millennium Declaration initiative to rid
the world of poverty, called for a multi-part meeting to promote access
to the Internet and information across the world.129 WSIS involved
governments, technology companies, and other public interest or-
ganizations in discussions addressing a wide range of issues, from how
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to “govern” the Internet, to spam, to increasing access to communica-
tions technologies around the world.130
Two concluding documents from the Geneva phase of WSIS, the
Declaration of Principles and the Plan of Action, cited spam as a prob-
lem requiring international attention and committed the parties to
working together to solve this problem.131 After the Geneva phase, the
WSIS convened a Thematic Meeting on Countering Spam.132 This
meeting gathered governments, consumer groups, ISPs, nongovern-
mental organizations, and experts from the software and Internet
technology industries to discuss the latest efforts in combating spam.133
The parties to the meeting made several political, legal, and technical
recommendations on how to combat spam and also provided an over-
view of the current state of global anti-spam efforts.134 Finally, the Tunis
phase produced even more statements of international commitment to
ªght spam.135
G. Brief Overview of Internet Governance
Another one of the focus areas of WSIS was a global discussion of
“Internet governance.”136 Although it does not have a speciªc
deªnition, at its heart, Internet governance includes the private or-
ganizations, governments, treaty organizations, and other bodies that,
to some degree, govern the Internet.137 Because the Internet is bor-
derless and has so many constituencies, national governments have a
limited role in Internet governance, which they share with many
other institutions.138 For this reason, there is much debate about
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whether there should be any formal governing structure and how ef-
fective such a structure can be.139
At the heart of this debate is the Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers (ICANN), which was established in the
United States as the organization that controls the core domain name
system by providing ISPs and companies with their Internet domain
names.140 ICANN serves as a quasi-international body, which manages
the domain name distribution and conºict resolution process for the
entire Internet.141 ICANN is incorporated under U.S. contract law and
is subject to U.S. law.142 Many other countries believe that a United Na-
tions body, such as the ITU, should govern such a critical aspect of the
Internet and have pushed towards this result in the WSIS context.143
At this point, there is no central governance institution con-
cerned with the ªght against spam, but the debates on Internet gov-
ernance in general and ICANN in particular may inform the debate
about the feasibility of such an institution.144
II. Discussion
International efforts to combat spam present many difªcult is-
sues.145 At the same time, however, there is consensus that spam is a
problem that needs an international response.146 The challenge, there-
fore, is in ªnding the common ground on which to move forward. 147
                                                                                                                     
139 See generally Declan McCullagh, Internet Showdown in Tunis, Cnet News.com, Nov. 11,
2005, http://news.com.com/Internet+showdown+in+Tunis/2008-1012_3-5945200.html;
Markus Kummer, The Results of the WSIS Negotiations on Internet Governance, in Internet Gov-
ernance, supra note 45, at 53, 53–55.
140 See generally Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Beyond ICANN vs. ITU: Will WSIS Open New Terri-
tory for Internet Governance?, in Internet Governance, supra note 45, at 31, 32, 38–40.
141 Klein, The Internet, supra note 128, at 950–53.
142 Id. at 948–51.
143 Id. at 959–61.
144 Kleinwächter, supra note 140, at 32 (noting that in the early stages of WSIS, some
governments wanted to expand the concept of Internet governance to include many
Internet related issues such as spam and illegal content and to have an international insti-
tution such as the ITU to take over this initiative).
145 See generally Horton, supra note 2, ¶¶ 23–35.
146 See, e.g., Declaration of Principles, supra note 11, ¶ 37; Michelle Delio, Spam Gets
Its Claws in the U.N., Wired News, Mar. 28, 2004, http://www.wired.com/news/poli-
tics/0,1283,62824,00.html.
147 See Sarrocco, supra note 2, at 18.
338 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 29:323
A. Freedom of Speech, Regulation of Commerce, and Spam Deªnitions
One of the threshold issues in the ªght against spam is how to
deªne it.148 It may be tempting to simply call all unwanted e-mail
spam, or to take an approach similar to the one Justice Potter Stewart
used to deªne pornography (“I know it when I see it.”),149 but a more
speciªc deªnition is necessary to create enforceable spam laws.150
Some say that all unsolicited bulk e-mail (UBE) should be considered
spam, while others suggest that the messages must also be commercial
in nature.151 The latter messages are known as unsolicited Commer-
cial E-mail (UCE).152 Still others argue that to be considered spam, a
message must have no “unsubscribe” mechanism and must somehow
disguise its sender or its intent with fraudulent or misleading header
information.153
Underlying these various deªnitions is a range of ideas behind
what is an appropriate use of Internet resources.154 Most people agree
that for a message to be considered spam, it must be bulk in nature.155
This is because the primary problem of spam is that it consumes us-
ers’ time and bandwidth.156 Of course, the other key component is
that the message be unsolicited.157
A key debate, therefore, is whether noncommercial bulk e-mails
should be considered spam.158 These include charitable fundraising
solicitations, political ads, chain letters, and other such messages.159
Those who would prefer to limit the scope of “spam” to UCE argue that
private and public spam enforcement should primarily punish those
who use spam for proªtable gain.160 Those who support broader UBE
restrictions argue that since the harm is the same for any spam mes-
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sage, they should all be combated.161 The United States, however, has
constitutional restrictions against regulating non-commercial speech
and is unable to broadly regulate UBE.162
The issue of how to deªne spam, which necessarily touches upon
the ªne distinction between legitimate commercial speech and un-
wanted spam, is a difªcult one.163 It presents a complex policy ques-
tion about how much commercial speech is appropriate and at what
point it intrudes on the rights of others.164
In the United States, the First Amendment restricts Congress’s
ability to pass enforceable anti-spam legislation.165 The Supreme
Court held in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion of New York that the First Amendment protects commercial speech
from regulation, provided that it is otherwise lawful and not mislead-
ing.166 If the speech meets these criteria, then any regulation of it
must directly advance a substantial governmental interest and must
not be more extensive than necessary to meet that objective.167 In de-
veloping the CAN-SPAM Act, Congress could therefore only narrowly
regulate bulk e-mail messages that are not misleading or otherwise
illegal.168 To regulate these more legitimate commercial e-mails, Con-
gress needed to assert that the law was necessary to serve a substantial
government interest.169 Congress reasoned that even non-misleading
or illegal spam must be regulated to preserve “the viability of e-mail as
a medium of communication” because “there is a real danger that this
medium will be rendered useless without regulation.”170 Considering
the massive amounts of spam relative to legitimate e-mail, Congress
was able to ªnd a substantial government purpose to meet the Central
Hudson test.171
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Nonetheless, to meet the proportionality requirement, the CAN-
SPAM Act needed to rely on an opt-out approach to UBE.172 This
permitted “legitimate” e-mail marketing messages to be sent once, as
long as consumers could opt out of further messages.173 Although an
opt-in approach would probably be a more effective anti-spam regime,
it could very well be found to be disproportionate in that it would
block many mailings that could be considered protected commercial
speech.174
While the CAN-SPAM Act has a lenient opt-out policy to conform
to U.S. law, it does set some standards for what is acceptable spam and
what is not, including e-mail with forged identities, fraudulent
schemes, viruses, and those without reliable opt-out mechanisms.175
These basic rules roughly correspond to spam laws in other
countries, even if those countries have stricter, opt-in legislation.176
Nonetheless, these two approaches do present a problem in creating
any enforceable international spam regime.177 If the international
community were to adopt a multilateral agreement on spam, it may
be forced to adopt an opt-out approach, which is the lowest common
denominator approach to national spam laws.178 Though this ap-
proach would be weaker than the existing laws in many countries, this
may be necessary to set minimum enforcement standards that all
countries can accept.179 If it were to adopt a stricter opt-in approach,
countries such as the United States may have to reject it due to do-
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mestic constitutional grounds.180 Since the United States produces the
lion’s share of global spam, this problem could render such an inter-
national cooperation effort useless.181
B. Internet Governance Debate
Another challenge in developing a global solution to the spam
problem involves the question of whether the Internet can or should
be governed, and if so, by whom.182
Some scholars wonder if it is possible to govern the Internet or if
this would even be beneªcial.183 Some say any attempts at formal gov-
ernance are futile since the Internet is such a huge, seemingly uncon-
trollable network.184 They argue that because the Internet spans bor-
ders, there is really no government or institution that can possibly
regulate it.185 Even if regulation were possible, these scholars fear that
too much control could risk stiºing the open communication, entre-
preneurship, and inherently democratic virtues of the Internet.186
Their concern is that too much intervention in the Internet could stiºe
commerce by cutting back on new innovations, and could impose the
social mores of one group on the global Internet community.187
Nonetheless, several organizations play some Internet governance
roles already.188 Most prominent among these is ICANN, which moni-
tors the domain name system and is the ultimate authority behind the
naming conventions on the Internet.189 ICANN works to establish con-
tract-based rules to resolve public policy domain problems such as
copyright and trademark infringement issues among domain owners.190
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Other national government institutions also regulate online commerce
in their countries.191 In addition, the World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization (WIPO) has created some standards for content over the
Internet and has mandated that its member states create and enforce
Internet-related intellectual property laws.192
Some private individuals, companies, and other organizations have
played governance roles as well.193 Standards bodies, for example, de-
velop the protocols that are used on the Internet, such as for e-mail, the
World Wide Web, and display technologies such as HTML.194 ISPs, as
the gateways to the Internet, have some control over the actions of
Internet users.195 With regard to spam, ISPs have the power to block e-
mails from senders before they get to their targets.196 So to some ex-
tent, technology developers, private ISPs, and users play more of a role
in Internet governance than do the governmental bodies discussed
above.197 Some people argue that spam regulation should be primarily
left up to the private sector, with its constant improvements in anti-
spam technology.198 They argue that spam legislation and enforcement
takes too long, that the laws are redundant because existing laws al-
ready cover privacy and fraud, and that private technological solutions
are already bearing fruit in the ªght against spam.199 They argue that
there is no need for any public or private centralized authority to man-
age the Internet or to combat spam and instead argue for a decentral-
ized, private form of governance.200 Such a system, based on a “peer
production” model, puts governance in the hands of end users, ISPs,
and employers who run the local networks that people use.201
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Sometimes, however, individuals need true “hard law” to fall back
on, when private regulation is not sufªcient.202 In the spam context,
this could happen when a purportedly legitimate spammer feels his
free speech has been violated by an over-sensitive ISP that blocks his e-
mail.203 In this case, the spammer may want to pursue his claim in court
under substantive law, as opposed to ªghting directly with ISPs.204
 Internet governance and spam regulation are therefore gov-
erned by a sort of partnership between private and public institu-
tions.205 The question remains, however, how to organize all of these
parties to best combat the spam problem.206
As discussed in Part II, many foreign governments and institutions
believe that the United Nations, or one of its constituent organizations
such as the ITU, should have the ultimate authority over Internet gov-
ernance.207 They feel that American institutions such as ICANN do not
represent global interests as well as a UN body would.208 On the other
hand, some scholars believe that UN management may lead to limita-
tions on free speech on the Internet and spam policy, as non-
democratic member states apply pressure for censorship policies.209
Any international spam resolution must take into account this debate
between private governance institutions, quasi-governmental institu-
tions such as ICANN, and international treaty organizations such as
ITU or WIPO.210
C. Intergovernmental Cooperation & Enforcement Challenges
Though in recent years the international community has urged
multilateral cooperation in the ªght against spam, many barriers to
effective enforcement remain.211 One challenge in developing a co-
operation regime is that the ªght against spam is a “horizontal” chal-
lenge affecting many different areas of the law, including “telecom-
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munications, trade, privacy, and consumer protection.”212 As a result,
non-spam legislation, such as anti-fraud or privacy laws, often target
spammers as much as laws that speciªcally target spam.213 In addition,
even when countries have spam-speciªc laws, the related enforcement
powers can vary.214 Many countries do not offer criminal sanctions
against spammers and only offer civil ªnes, while others offer these
sanctions as well as private causes of action by either individuals or
ISPs.215 It is therefore challenging to develop an international regime
that is ºexible enough to account for the differences in the relevant
local laws that affect spam.216
Similarly, most countries have several regulatory bodies that are
responsible for spam.217 In the United States, for example, the FTC
and state attorneys general both enforce spam laws.218 In other coun-
tries, this authority is vested in multiple agencies; for example, in the
United Kingdom, the Information Commissioner and the ofªce of
Fair Trading and Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for Trade and In-
dustry all have some authority in this area.219
Adding another layer of complexity to the problem, many coun-
tries do not yet have any spam-speciªc legislation and currently have
no plans to develop it.220 This further complicates any coordination
efforts among various states.221
Another issue with spam coordination is the cost of investigating
and enforcing spam laws.222 Spammers have become very skilled at hid-
ing their identities through the use of technology, which signiªcantly
increases the costs of enforcement.223 Because there are so many spam-
mers, this would require hundreds of spam prosecutions, which of
course drives up the costs considerably.224 Many countries will only be
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willing to cooperate in investigating or prosecuting spammers in cases
where there are signiªcant damages.225 Countries have many more im-
portant ways of spending their resources than prosecuting spammers,
unless the value of the prosecution is clear.226 This presents the problem
of deªning exactly what kinds of spam, and how much of it, causes
enough damage to warrant the expense of international cooperation.227
Any cooperation regime must also spell out exactly what informa-
tion must be shared across borders and what the expectations are for
each party.228 The MoU between the United States, Australia and the
United Kingdom may provide a starting point for a comprehensive
cooperation mechanism.229 Rather than deªning spam or mandating
any speciªc spam laws, it defers to the laws and institutions of the par-
ticipating countries.230 It commits the parties to help each other
gather evidence, serve process, share technology, and otherwise coor-
dinate in the battle against spam.231 It further provides for a strict
conªdentiality system to preserve the privacy of the parties involved in
any international spam investigation.232 The MoU, however, is merely
aspirational, in that it does not create any “binding obligations under
international law or under the domestic laws of the Participants.”233
While loose agreements such as the MoU may be helpful, in light
of the discussions at the various WSIS meetings, perhaps a more force-
ful agreement can be negotiated to combat spam on a larger scale.234
Just as there are already several multilateral Internet governance insti-
tutions such as ICANN and the WIPO, perhaps a new organization,
with its authority provided for in a multilateral treaty, can be created
with limited jurisdiction over spam enforcement and cooperation.235
III. Analysis
Though there are many challenges to improving international
cooperation on spam, WSIS provided a forum where many
stakeholders around the world could debate the problem and begin
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to develop comprehensive solutions.236 The various sessions of WSIS
discussed the many issues of the spam problem, and brought to light
many initiatives that are being tried around the world.237 At the end of
the Tunis phase of the summit, the parties agreed to “adopt a multi-
pronged approach to counter spam that includes, inter alia, consumer
and business education; appropriate legislation, law enforcement
authorities, and tools; the continued development of technical and
self-regulatory measures; best practices, and international coopera-
tion.”238
In light of this decision, the challenge before the international
community is how to expand on the existing multi-pronged approaches
that were discussed at WSIS, such as the MoU, and create a framework
that enables truly global cooperation in the ªght against spam.239 Any
cooperative system must be ºexible enough to meet domestic constitu-
tional requirements and effectively interrelate with domestic laws while
being forceful enough to deter spammers at an international level.240
At the same time, such a system must not stiºe the innovative capabili-
ties of the private sector, technology companies, and ISPs, who provide
the critical front-line defense against spam.241 The framework must also
enhance international cooperation to enable investigation, prosecu-
tion, and civil lawsuits against spammers who take advantage of the
global nature of the Internet.242
Perhaps the best way to balance the interests involved would be to
create a multilateral treaty organization that strengthens and expands
upon the MoU and other similar initiatives, while preserving their
ºexibility to account for jurisdictional differences.243 Because of the
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ºexibility required to address the spam issue, the challenges posed by
creating one organization that would govern international spam law
and enforcement are probably insurmountable.244 It would be advis-
able, therefore, to create a body with more modest goals.245 This or-
ganization could be modeled after the WIPO or the World Heath Or-
ganization, which encourage cross-border cooperation in their respective
areas of expertise. It would require its members to enact some kinds of
spam legislation and to provide for a minimal amount of enforcement
and international cooperation.246 It could serve as a clearinghouse or-
ganization that funds technological and legal research and encourages
nation-states to enter into multi-lateral agreements to help stop
spam.247 This body would not, however, follow the ICANN model in
attempting to create binding law that could effectively be enforced in
multiple jurisdictions; rather it would set minimum standards for
membership and develop and encourage new ways of cross-border co-
operation.248
A. Addressing Constitutional & Deªnitional Questions
For any international agreement on spam to work, it must re-
quire that member states enact spam laws that include a baseline
deªnition of spam.249 The deªnitional aspect is crucial, not only be-
cause it provides for a basic understanding of what is considered to be
spam, but depending on how broadly spam is deªned, it has the po-
tential to implicate constitutional speech regulations.250 Thus, to en-
sure that many countries participate, this deªnition may need to
adopt a “lowest common denominator” approach and set a standard
that will produce minimal constitutional challenges in countries like
the United States.251 Consequently, the minimal standard would likely
have to be an “opt-out” approach.252 The agreement can follow the
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lead of the MoU, however, and give member countries the ºexibility
to adopt stricter, opt-in regimes if they choose to do so.253
The opt-in/opt-out debate may not, in fact, be a major stumbling
block for agreements.254 Empirical evidence shows that the most suc-
cessful prosecutions have arisen out of opt-out regimes, largely be-
cause it is very difªcult to prove that a user has not opted in to receiv-
ing a particular message.255 With this in mind, it may be more
practical to adopt a seemingly lenient standard for spam enforce-
ment.256
The minimum deªnition of spam can follow the lead of the EU
Directive 2002/58/EC, which established some “basic rules” that
deªne spam.257 These rules would declare spam illegal if it is UCE
(this would not encompass all UBE, however) and does not have a
working opt-out mechanism.258 In addition, any of the following items
would qualify a message as illegal spam: (1) it contains fraudulent sub-
ject headers, sender addresses, sender domains, or sender
identiªcation; (2) it is misleading in its nature; (3) it is otherwise ille-
gal under existing laws for fraud, trademark, copyright, or other regu-
latory areas, such as unlicensed pharmaceutical sales.259
B. Resolving Enforcement Challenges
This anti-spam organization would set standards for what spam
crimes are worthy of international cooperation, and if these standards
were met, it would mandate that member states cooperate to the full-
est extent possible.260 It would set a threshold, using such variables as
(1) quantity of spam; (2) amount of money lost due to fraud or iden-
tity theft; (3) other laws breached.261 Like the MoU, it would be
ºexible to enable cooperation regardless of the speciªc enforcement
bodies in various countries.262
This organization would also create a system through which any
state investigating a spammer that meets the above threshold can re-
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quest that other states investigate individuals and servers located in
their jurisdiction and, if necessary, serve process to the relevant par-
ties.263
Additionally, as a result of the jurisdictional problems associated
with identifying and locating spammers and investigating the servers
used in sending spam, the agreement should require that member
states establish laws asserting jurisdiction over domestic Internet activ-
ity as well as domains using their ccTLDs.264 This would enable, for
example, the United Kingdom to assert jurisdiction over all e-mails
sent from the .uk domain, even if the message was not sent from, or
even routed through, any servers in the country.265 This way, if the
United States wants to investigate a spammer who sent a message
from a British server, or who used a .uk e-mail address, the United
Kingdom government will have jurisdiction to investigate if it receives
a request under the agreement from the United States.266 At the same
time, the treaty must be ºexible enough to account for domestic pri-
vacy and conªdentiality rules.267
The parties would need to determine whether international
spam laws should, at a minimum, provide for civil or criminal en-
forcement, or both.268 Prosecuting spammers can be exceedingly ex-
pensive, largely because it is so costly to investigate a spammer, and
because so many must be prosecuted before a law can have any mean-
ingful effect.269 Perhaps it would be effective for a treaty to mandate
that countries enable private parties, such as ISPs, to bring civil ac-
tions against spammers.270 This would shift the ªnancial burden away
from government to the parties that are most affected by spam.271
Given that some countries’ spam laws provide only civil causes of ac-
tion, the agreement may once again require a lowest common de-
nominator approach and mandate only that member states provide
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for state-initiated civil actions, while enabling cooperation with those
states that choose to impose criminal sanctions as well.272
Because spam touches so many areas of law, it may be very difªcult
to limit the scope of an anti-spam treaty to avoid interfering with exist-
ing law enforcement mechanisms that target other related crimes.273 It
is therefore important that the investigation and enforcement rules
conªne themselves to a narrow deªnition of spam, while relying on
existing laws and agreements to combat other offenses.274
C. Internet Governance and the Role of the Technology Industry
This proposed spam agreement can attempt to strike a balance
between those who feel that the Internet needs centralized authority
and those who prefer a “peer production” model.275 Perhaps this or-
ganization can help provide some technical leadership in the ªght
against spam, without mandating any speciªc technical solutions.276 It
could help lead the way by serving as a clearinghouse for spam tech-
nologies and a conduit for ISPs and policy makers around the
world.277 It would fund private research and development of anti-spam
technologies and would be a central point of reference for govern-
ments and technology companies about the latest available standards
to combat spam.278 In order to encourage competition and innovation
among competing technology providers, however, this organization
would not mandate the use of any speciªc technologies.279 It would,
however, make short-term recommendations, based on empirical evi-
dence, about what solutions have been shown to be successful and
would encourage cooperation between ISPs, users, and technology
companies to help root out the spam problem.280
This loose framework could provide guidance to those countries
that need it the most, including the developing nations that are just
beginning to invest in their Internet infrastructure.281 At the same
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time, it would enable ISPs and other Internet companies to explore
new technologies that help keep up with the spammers when they
have the resources to experiment.282
This organization would also serve as a point of reference to help
national governments educate users and ISPs about the threat of
spam and how to avoid it.283 This would help clarify spam-ªghting
strategies and best-practices for those countries that need it.284
The ªght against spam does not need to be completely centralized,
as the domain name system is currently managed by ICANN.285 Instead,
this new organization can allow governments and private institutions to
deal with the problems in their own way, as long as certain minimum
standards are met.286 This solution could provide the centralized guid-
ance that some countries need in their ªght against spam while also
keeping technical control decentralized, thereby quelling the fears that
centralized authority will stiºe free speech on the Internet.287
D. Advantages of This Approach
In general, this organization would provide for a ºexible, multi-
tiered approach to combat spam.288 The ªrst tier is action-oriented, in
that it would mandate that member states enact spam laws, and com-
mit themselves to cooperating in investigation and limited enforce-
ment in the most egregious spam cases.289 It would provide basic legal
standards and provide a framework for international cooperation and
either civil or criminal enforcement.290
The second tier would be to serve as a central point of contact in
the war against spam, in its role as a promoter of new technologies
and cooperation between governments, ISPs, corporations, and us-
ers.291 This structure would balance the various issues in the Internet
governance debate by continuing to promote technological standards
and peer production to independently block spam, while providing a
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backstop for when these policies fail.292 This system would not “create
an international government for the Internet,” as some fear; it would
simply provide some basic standards for national governmental coop-
eration.293
Conclusion
As spam has continued to proliferate, the private sector, national
governments, and the international community have sought innovative
ways to combat the problem. It has become clear that a multi-tiered
strategy that leverages the skills in all of these areas is critical to combat
spam. New technologies and coordination among ISPs are a critical
ªrst step, and national governments can provide prosecution and other
legal remedies to go after spammers who get past these technologies.
Without international cooperation, however, spammers can avoid the
reach of governments by sending their spam across borders.
WSIS brought all of the relevant parties together to begin resolving
the spam problem. Now that the international community is united
against spam, they have an opportunity to develop new ways of coordi-
nating the ªght. The international community should take this oppor-
tunity to negotiate a broad-ranging international agreement that takes
advantage of the skills of all relevant parties, without interfering with
the commercial rights of citizens or the sovereign prosecutorial power
of individual states.
Several smaller coordination and enforcement agreements have
been implemented so far, and in light of the commitments made at
WSIS, the international community can strengthen them with a
ºexible international agreement that requires members to get more
involved in the ªght against spam. At the same time, the organization
created by this agreement would serve as an important clearinghouse
for educational materials and technology standards for all relevant
parties to use in their efforts to eliminate the problem. There is no
“silver bullet” that will eliminate spam, but with the right planning,
the international community can develop a clear, coordinated, inter-
national strategy to combat spam now, while remaining ºexible
enough to adapt to evolving spam technologies in the future.
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